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Comment
Righting Constitutional Wrongs: The
Development of a Constitutionally Implied
Cause of Action for Damages
I. INTRODUCTION
Remedies are an integral and necessary part of any system of law,
for the substantive rights are impotent unless a means for asserting
those rights exists.' Recognizing the importance of providing for
remedies, Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison2 insisted that
remedies for the violation of vested rights must be available to insure
that the United States government remains a "government of laws and
not of men."'3 Although the United States Constitution specifically
defines substantive rights and duties, it leaves undefined, or only par-
tially defined, the remedies available in the event that such rights or
duties are violated. Habeas corpus relief in article I, section 9 appears
to be the only explicit remedy provided for constitutional implementa-
tion.' This noticeable absence of constitutional remedies 5 has prompted
the judiciary to fashion appropriate forms of redress.
It has been suggested that the United States Supreme Court's
1. Blackstone in his COMMENTARIES recognized that laws which do not provide a
remedial provision are vague and imperfect: "For in vain would rights be declared, in vain
directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights
when wrongfully withheld or invaded." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 55-56 (4th ed. J.
Andrews 1855).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 163. Specifically, Justice Marshall wrote:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every in-
dividual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection ....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."
5. The term "constitutional remedies" has been aptly defined as "remedies that are
available as a matter of constitutional right for the redress of constitutional wrongs." Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hill].
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power to create remedies can be found, if at all, in the spare language
of article III: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising
under this Constitution . . . ."I The creation of constitutional remedies
under the Court's general remedial authority,7 rather than by legisla-
tive mandate, not only guarantees the effectiveness of the substantive
law but also guards against the possibility of legislative discrimination
of constitutional rights. Moreover, once the Supreme Court decides
upon a remedy which appropriately implements the Constitution,
federal and state courts are obliged to afford such remedies. Thus,
judicial creation of remedies assures instant enforcement of constitu-
tional liberties and a readily available means of appeal should the
remedy granted be considered inadequate.
Where the Court, acting under the general grant of authority, has
rendered defensive remedies,8 the decisions have been tacitly accepted
and followed. Where the Court has granted affirmative remedies, how-
ever, particularly th6 judgment for damages,9 the decisions have met
with severe criticism that the judiciary is usurping legislative
powers. 10 This disparity of treatment has been faulted since there is no
apparent reason for permitting the Supreme Court to grant defensive
remedies and yet denying this same Court the authority to grant a
remedy at law in cases where such a remedy is essential for the ef-
fectuation of a constitutional right.11
In the seminal case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,2 the Supreme Court, speaking through
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Con-
stitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1541 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dellinger].
7. General remedial authority permits the Court to design the appropriate constitu-
tional remedy. Legislative remedies are not only unnecessary but also risk vulnerability,
if the enumeration of certain remedies is deemed evidence of an intention to exclude
others. Hill, supra note 5, at 1118.
8. See id. at 1111-12. For cases in which defensive remedies have been applied, see,
e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Supreme Court reversed a conviction in a
criminal case, without regard to actual prejudice, where the defendant was not afforded
representation by counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Supreme Court held inad-
missible evidence obtained by an unreasonable search or seizure).
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
10. Although Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun filed separate
dissenting opinions in Bivens, each concluded that the creation of a constitutional remedy
was a matter of legislative rather than judicial concern. 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
generally Dellinger, supra note 6, at 1541.
Two of the three dissenting opinions filed in Davis include the same expression of con-
cern for separation of power as appeared in the Bivens dissents. Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 249-51 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 251-55 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. See Dellinger, supra note 6, at 1542-43.
12. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Constitutional Damages Remedy
Justice Brennan, held that a cause of action for damages directly arises
under the Constitution when fourth amendment rights are violated. 3
With one exception" prior to Bivens, the Court had never explicitly ex-
ercised the judicial power to create a damage remedy for a case aris-
ing under the Constitution. The Bivens decision in the early part of the
Seventies was the only major pronouncement of the Court in this area
and has spawned considerable argument in the lower federal courts.
Essentially, the federal courts have had to determine whether to limit
Bivens only to fourth amendment claims or to extend the remedy to
claims arising under other amendments. Absent further analysis and
interpretation of Bivens by the Supreme Court, 5 the lower federal
courts have unsuccessfully attempted to define the limits of this newly
created constitutional remedy. But with the most recent decisions of
the Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman"6 and Carlson v. Green,7 the
Court has finally reviewed the Bivens remedy and held that a cause of
action for damages may be directly implied under the fifth and eighth
amendments.
This comment seeks to outline the development of the Bivens con-
stitutionally implied cause of action for damages. To achieve this end,
the comment will review pre-Bivens cases which recognized the need
for the constitutional remedy and analyze the landmark Bivens deci-
sion itself, discussing the treatment the cause of action has received in
the federal circuits, especially in the areas of first, fifth, and four-
teenth amendment rights. Finally, the most recent announcements by
the Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman and Carlson v. Green will be
explicated and analyzed in terms of their contribution to the overall
development of the constitutional damages remedy.
II. BIVENS: THE CREATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES REMEDY
Although the Supreme Court had decided at a very early date in
13. For an examination of pre-Bivens literature discussing remedial implementation
of the Constitution, see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 312-40 (1953); Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 181 (1969); Hill, note 5 supra; Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional
Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Katz].
14. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (a private party has a right of action
against the government for just compensation for the taking of his property under the
fifth amendment).
15. In cases following Bivens, the Supreme Court left open the question whether an
action for damages might be implied under the constitutional amendments other than the
fourth amendment. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1976); City of Charlotte v. Local 660,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 284 n.1 (1976).
16. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
17. 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980).
1980
Duquesne Law Review
Bell v. Hood 8 that a federal district court has jurisdiction, under 28
U.S.C. § 1331,9 of a claim for damages against federal officers for viola-
tions of the fourth amendment, the Bell decision reserved the question
of the merits-whether such a claim for damages stated a legitimate
federal cause of action. In the subsequent decision of Wheeldin v.
Wheeler,' the Supreme Court again avoided deciding the propriety of
a constitutional action for damages against a federal officer by finding
that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of ac-
tion. According to the Court, the facts did not establish that there had
been a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. In both of these instances, where the Supreme Court had recog-
nized the existence of a federally protected right, the corresponding
duty of the judiciary to protect that right, and the remedial flexibility
possessed by the courts,2 it appears that the Supreme Court's next
logical step would have been to grant the plaintiffs request for a con-
stitutional damages remedy. Yet, these early decisions in the area
merely provided the inception of an idea which would not be realized
until the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.'
18. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). In Bell, a member of the "mankind united" organization claimed
that FBI agents had violated his fourth and fifth amendment rights by imprisoning him
and subjecting his premises to search and his possessions to seizure. Because the claim
arose directly under the Constitution and the requisite amount in controversy had been
alleged, the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the federal district court. The district
court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Bell v. Hood, 150 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1945).
19. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. at 390.
20. 373 U.S. 647 (1963). The petitioner in Wheeldin brought suit in federal district
court alleging violation of his fourth amendment rights by a federal officer. Both injunc-
tive and monetary relief were sought; neither remedy was granted. Damages were not
permitted since the district court found that no such federal action existed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing Bell v. Hood. Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 280 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1960). On remand, the district court dismissed the com-
plaint without an opinion, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the federal
agent had acted within the scope of his authority. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 302 F.2d 36 (9th
Cir. 1962).
21. The Bell Court expressly recognized the duty of the judiciary to afford remedies
for the violation of federally protected rights and also the remedial flexibility available to
the courts:
Moreover, where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federalcourts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
327 U.S. at 684 (footnotes omitted).
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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On November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
acting under a claim of federal \authority, entered the apartment of
Webster Bivens and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations.
Bivens was manacled in front of his wife and children and then taken
to the Federal Narcotics Bureau where he was interrogated,
photographed, and strip searched." On July 7, 1976, Bivens brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York,' claiming a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for viola-
tion of his civil rights.2 ' Bivens' complaint asserted that the federal of-
ficers made a warrantless search and arrest which caused him to suffer
great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering. As redress for
this injury, he sought $15,000 damages from each agent." Concluding,
inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the
district court dismissed the suit.' The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ' and certiorari was subse-
quently granted by the United States Supreme Court.2'
Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion in Bivens' which
reversed the decision of the court of appeals. In analyzing the propri-
ety of a constitutional damages remedy, he followed the steps already
outlined in Bell and Wheeldin. Initially, he explained that the fourth
amendment guarantees to each American citizen the absolute right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and that the peti-
tioner's complaint stated a legitimate cause of action under the fourth
amendment." Having revealed the existence and subsequent violation
of a federal right, Justice Brennan, expressly citing Bell v. Hood"2 as
authority, next indicated the duty of the courts to provide relief and
23. Id. at 389.
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F.
Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), afrd, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laWs, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
26. 403 U.S. at 390.
27. 276 F. Supp. at 16.
28. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d
718 (2d Cir. 1969), revd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
29. 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
30. The opinion was a six to three decision. Justices Douglas, Stewart, White, and
Marshall joined in the majority opinion written by Justice Brennan. Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred specially. The three separate dissents were authored by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Black and Blackmun.
31. 403 U.S. at 392.
32. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
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the remedial flexibility enjoyed by the courts to safeguard federal
rights." Although the prior Supreme Court pronouncements had ended
the analysis at that point, the Bivens Court took that next critical step
and the decision became the vehicle for the creation of a constitutional
damages remedy.
Although Justice Brennan conceded that the fourth amendment does
not expressly provide for an award of monetary damages for the conse-
quences of its violation,u he did not believe this factor completely
barred the remedy. 5 Moreover, the absence of a congressional declara-
tion concerning the correctness of monetary damages was not con-
sidered fatal.N Because a federal right had been transgressed, Justice
Brennan explained, it is the fundamental duty of the judiciary to use
any available remedy to insure the protection of this right.7 Damages
are instantly appropriate, he reasoned, since they historically have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for invasions of personal in-
terests in liberty' and are normally available in federal courts as a
remedial mechanism to redress injury. 9 In sum, he concluded that an
action for damages can lie when fourth amendment rights are
violated."9
Seemingly, the key factor influencing the majority opinion was the
Court's acute recognition that the Constitution, the supreme law of the
land, had actually failed to provide a means for asserting the rights it
guaranteed. Because laws incapable of effectuation are sterile, furnish-
ing instant remedial relief was essential. Furthermore, Bivens would
not have an adequate remedy unless damages were awarded." In
determining that the judiciary could properly and competently decide
what remedy would be appropriate, the Court adopted a rather expan-
sive view of the role of the federal courts.42 This view became the focal
point of argument in the dissenting opinions.
33. 403 U.S. at 392.
34. Id. at 396.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 397.
37. Id. at 396, (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).
38. 403 U.S. at 395.
39. Id. at 397.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan recognized that in Bivens' case
the only appropriate form of relief was monetary damages. He immediately dismissed in-
junctive relief as a remedy and further reasoned that the exclusionary rule was irrelevant
because of Bivens' innocence of the crimes charged. A direct remedy against the govern-
ment was also deficient, according to Justice Harlan, since sovereign immunity is yet in
force. Thus, he concluded, "For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." Id.
42. Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action
for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HAsTiNGs CONST. L.Q. 531, 544 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Lehmann].
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The majority in Bivens was specifically faulted by the dissenting
Justices for usurping the powers of Congress; although each of the
three dissenting Justices wrote separate opinions, they all agreed that
the judiciary does not possess the authority to create quasi-
constitutional law in the form of a damages remedy to vindicate con-
stitutional liberties." The dissenters, however, failed to explain why
the courts in the constitutional setting cannot be allowed to grant
damages, but are permitted to fashion some remedial devices, in-
cluding, inter alia, injunctive relief, exclusion of evidence, and reversal
of sentence.' Additionally, the dissenting Justices did not distinguish
the unquestioned ability of the judiciary to provide remedial relief in
the absence of statutory prescriptions, a situation clearly paralleling
the constitutional problem. 5 Surely, the commands of the Constitution
are equally as important as, if not more important than, the commands
outlined in ordinary legislation and must be guaranteed implementa-
tion by every means available. In this regard, it has been suggested
that because it is the absence of contrary legislative expression which
frees the courts to engage in remedial creativity in the case of or-
dinary statutes, the similar absence of expression in the Constitution
should enable the courts to fashion remedies protective of constitu-
tional interests in liberty." If the underlying premise of the dissenters'
argument is valid, courts should refrain from inventing any type of
relief-defensive and/or affirmative -where violation of statutory or
43. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
44. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan, recognizing the inequity of the situation, stated, "[T]he presumed availability of
federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests appears en-
tirely to negate the contention that the status of an interest as constitutionally protected
divests federal courts of the power to grant damages absent express congressional
authorization." Id.
45. See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). These two cases offer the Supreme Court's most comprehensive treatment of im-
plied statutory causes of action. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 403-04 (Harlan, J., concurring). Commenting on the
apparent imperfection of such a system, Justice Harlan wrote:
I note that it would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal
judiciary-while competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial
remedies to implement statutory and common law policies, and even to generate
substantive rules governing primary behavior in furtherance of broadly formulated
policies articulated by statute or Constitution ... is powerless to accord a damages
remedy to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Con-
stitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument
of the popular will.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. Katz, note 13 supra.
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constitutional liberties occurs, and should instead await further direc-
tion from Congress. Because they failed to address these two critical
areas-granting equitable relief and creating statutory remedies-the
dissenters' opinions are flawed.
Although Bivens marked the creation of the implied cause of action
for damages under the Constitution, it has been recognized that the
decision fails to define the substantive limits of and the procedural con-
straints upon the newly created remedy." During the years immed-
iately following the decision, no explanatory decisions were offered by
the Court. As a result, the lower federal courts have been free to in-
terpret the extent of the remedial application of Bivens.
III. UNCERTAINTY IN THE CIRCUITS: How
FAR SHOULD BIVENS EXTEND?
Some facet of the Bivens question has been discussed in each of the
federal circuits. Thus far, the constitutional damages remedy has been
considered in causes of action arising under the first, fifth, sixth,
eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments. When the Bivens doc-
trine is expanded, however, there is a noticeable absence of thoughtful
deliberation in many of the decisions of the federal circuit courts; the
opinions are relatively short and uncomplicated and they offer little or
no rationale. At most, it appears that the courts will extract a key
phrase or sentence from the seminal Bivens case to substantiate the
position taken and then fail to offer further analysis on the point. For
example, in Gentile v. Wallen"' the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, by simply citing Bivens as precedent, 9 held that a teacher's
claim of denial of due process by the school board stated a cause of ac-
tion directly under the fourteenth amendment against the school board
in its official capacity." However, after recognizing that the cause of
action may directly arise under the fourteenth amendment, the Gentile
court found no need to determine the availability of monetary dam-
ages, 1 for the court found no "stigma triggering a Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interest .. .."I' Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Bennett v. Campbell-" mechanically cited to Bivens as
standing for the proposition that when a federal officer acting under
color of his authority deprives a person of his constitutional rights, he
47. Lehmann, supra note 42, at 544.
48. 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 196.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 197 n.4.
52. Id. at 198.
53. 564 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1977).
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becomes liable under an action for damages." With this sole support,
the Bennett court reversed a denial of a motion to amend a complaint
in order to permit the assertion of a Bivens-type claim under the
fourth and fifth amendments.5
A few of the circuits, however, have attempted to include some
analysis in their decisions which implement the Bivens constitutionally
implied cause of action for damages; in fact, the most detailed discus-
sions are found when the claims involve fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment due process claims and first amendment rights. Generally, before
these circuits decide to effect the Bivens cause of action, they engage
in a twofold inquiry: that is, the court must decide initially whether a
constitutional right is involved and then whether there. has been a
violation of that right. For example, in McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing
Co.," the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, inter alia, that
the plaintiff had failed to establish any right of recovery under either
the sixth amendment57 constitutional guarantee of a right to a fair trial
before an impartial jury or under the constitutionally protected right
to privacy. Although the McNally court recognized the existence of a
constitutional damages remedy, the court emphatically stated that as a
precondition to any ultimate success under the implied remedy of
Bivens, the plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of some constitu-
tional right."
Adopting this deprivation of right approach, at least three of the cir-
cuits have decided that violations of the first amendment can be
redressed by means of a Bivens cause of action." Offering the best
analysis for the applicability of Bivens in the area of first amendment
rights was Judge Rosenn, writing the opinion for the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Paton v. La Prade.1 In that case, a high school
student, Lori Paton, and the chairman of the school's social studies
department, William Gabrielson, brought suit against certain FBI
agents for alleged violations of constitutional rights and of rights
under a postal statute. As an assignment for her social studies class,
"Left to Right," which examined the contemporary political spectrum,
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id.
56. 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976). In McNally an inmate of a
federal penitentiary brought a civil rights action against various prison officials, a
newspaper publisher, and a reporter, seeking damages as well as injunctive relief.
57. See also Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281,
1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussion of Bivens remedy in relation to sixth amendment).
58. 532 F.2d at 76.
59. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical
Abstracts Serv., 521 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
60. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
1980
Duquesne Law Review
Paton wrote a letter to the Socialist Workers Party.6 1 Upon the re-
quest of the Acting Director of the FBI, a mail cover had been placed
upon the Socialist Workers Party headquarters in New York City. Be-
cause of the mail cover, the FBI received Paton's name and address
and began an investigation. After discovering the FBI activity, Paton
wrote to agent J. Wallace La Prade, special agent in charge of the
Newark FBI office, requesting the reason for the FBI investigation and
any files which had been compiled. La Prade replied that Paton was
not the subject of an investigation by the Bureau and provided no in-
formation about the records.2
Suit was instituted on July 24, 1973, in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. The complaint alleged, inter alia,
that the FBI had unconstitutionally intercepted Paton's letter which
resulted in an improper investigation of her and a compilation and
maintenance of a file on her. The complaint sought $65,000 in compen-
satory and punitive damages from La Prade and "John Doe," the spe-
cial agent in charge of the actual investigation. Although the district
court ordered expungement of the student's FBI file, it granted the
defendants summary judgment on all other issues. 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and
remanded the case. Particularly addressing the issue of a constitu-
tionally implied cause of action for damages, the appellate court be-
lieved the extension of the Bivens remedy to violations of first amend-
ment rights to be both justifiable and logical. 4 Judge Rosenn began his
analysis in Paton by establishing that first amendment rights are as
personal to an individual as the fourth amendment rights protected in
the Bivens decision, 5 and that where there has been an invasion of per-
sonal interests, damages historically have been regarded as the ordin-
ary remedy. Judge Rosenn then addressed the absence of congres-
sional authorization to extend the constitutionally implied cause of ac-
tion for damages and concluded that congressional approval is not im-
portant." Relying upon Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens,
Judge Rosenn emphasized the incongruity of a system which would al-
61. Id. at 865.
62. Id. at 866.
63. Paton v. LaPrade, 382 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1974), vacated and remanded, 524
F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
64. 524 F.2d at 870.
65. Id. at 869. Judge Rosenn reasoned that although the fourth amendment is
specifically addressed to the rights of citizens and the first amendment, by contrast, is
phrased as a limitation on Congress, the linguistic difference does not impair the implica-
tion of a private right of action under the first amendment. Id.




low the judiciary to choose among the range of traditional judicial
remedies to implement statutory and common law policies but not con-
stitutionally-protected liberties." To further illustrate the inequity of
the situation, Judge Rosenn pointed out that although no cause of ac-
tion existed for federal infringement of first amendment rights, an ag-
grieved individual could seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if his
rights had been violated by a state official. Determining that the
damage to an individual's first amendment right is the same, regard-
less of the perpetrator of the violation, Judge Rosenn could not ra-
tionalize the preference shown federal officials. 9 This last considera-
tion when added to the other enumerated points prompted the court to
extend Bivens to first amendment claims. Nevertheless, the court was
unable to grant Paton's claim for damages, finding that the record had
not clearly established that her constitutional right had in fact been
violated; remand to the district court was necessary before the dam-
ages issue could be finally decided.7"
Proving the violation of first amendment rights was an easy task for
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Dellums v.
Powell." By broadly construing Dellums' complaint, the court was able
to find a "first amendment violation directly traceable to the arresting
officers because the gravamen of the complaint was that Dellums' au-
dience was arrested, thereby preventing him from speaking to them."72
Instead, the key question in Dellums was the quantum of damages
which could be awarded once a first amendment violation had been
established.
The Dellums plaintiffs were several demonstrators who had been ar-
rested during a peace demonstration on the steps of the United States
Capital and Congressman Ronald V. Dellums who was addressing them
at the time of the arrest. Among other relief the plaintiffs sought
monetary compensation for the violation of their first amendment
rights. The action was brought against the chief of police and other ar-
resting officers of the District of Columbia. Judgment was entered on
the verdict for the arrestees and congressman. An appeal ensued.
Having determined monetary damages were an appropriate remedy
for first amendment violations, 3 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia placed its primary emphasis upon the quantum of damages
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 872.
71. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
72. Id. at 194-95. Moreover, the court recognized that the loss of an opportunity to
express to Congress one's dissatisfaction with the laws and policies of the United States
was at stake. Id. at 195.
73. Id. at 195.
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to be distributed and whether or not the distribution was ad-
ministrable by the courts. Regarding the quantum of damages issue, it
was decided that the monetary recompense should not be extravagant;
rather, it was to be proportional to the loss involved."' When deciding
the amount of damage, the jury is not to invoke its discretion "in-
formed only by platitudes about priceless rights," but must "focus on
the loss actually sustained by the plaintiffs."75 In dealing with the ad-
ministration issue, the court concluded that the first amendment in-
terest at stake is "in principle no less administrable than damage
awards for other intangible interests protected by the Constitution or
at common law," and that, historically, properly instructed juries have
routinely decided nonquantifiable interests, such as those at stake,
whose recompense is meted out in damages.78 In light of these guide-
lines, the $7,500 judgment awarded below in Dellums was found totally
disproportionate to any harm suffered. Correspondingly, the judgment
was vacated, and the damages issue remanded for redetermination.7
Although the Dellums opinion is constructed within the setting of the
first amendment, the guidelines offered for assessing the quantum of
damages can and should be applied each time a Bivens cause of action
is asserted, regardless of the constitutional basis advanced.
In addition to cases arising under the first amendment, those arising
under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
have prompted the federal circuits to analyze the application of Bivens
in some depth. In this respect, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency"8 reasoned that
nothing in the language of Bivens or its rationale exclusively limits a
constitutionally implied damages remedy to fourth amendment claims.
Accordingly, the Jacobson court extended Bivens to fifth amendment
claims, concluding that "rights protected by the Fifth Amendment due
process clause are as fundamental as Fourth Amendment rights.""
Agreeing that Bivens is not limited to fourth amendment violations is
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States ex rel
Moore v. Koelzer The Moore court, finding sufficient allegations of
fifth amendment violations, held that unless federal officers were im-
mune from suit, an action for damages could be maintained for alleged
74. Id.
75. Id. at 195-96.
76. Id. at 195.
77. Id. at 196. Error was specifically found because the jury was not required to
focus on the actual loss sustained by the plaintiffs. Id.
78. 558 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.), vacated, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 942.
80. 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972). The plaintiff in Moore filed a pro se complaint alleging
violations of his civil rights and of his constitutional rights to a fair trial.
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falsification of documents offered into evidence against the plaintiff in
a criminal prosecution, for giving false testimony under oath, and for
soliciting fraudulent testimony."
In Brault v. Town of Milton, 2 the"Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, en banc, reversed and remanded a panel decision of that same
appellate tribunal which held that plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause
of action stemming from the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment." The Braults had brought suit against the town of Milton,
Vermont, to recover damages for the town's alleged infringement of
their property rights.8 The United States District Court for the
District of Vermont dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
not authorize a suit against a town because a municipality is not a
"person" within the meaning of the statute's designation of potential
defendants." On appeal, the Braults conceded the validity of the
district court's rationale, but nonetheless maintained that the alter-
.native constitutional damages theory advanced in their complaint per-
mitted the action to lie." A panel of the court of appeals agreed with
the Braults' constitutional theory and resolved "that the Braults' in-
vocation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as the
source of their claim for relief [came] within Bivens' sweeping approba-
tion of constitutionally-based causes of action."'
Because of the importance of this issue, the court of appeals granted
appellees' application for rehearing of the appeal en banc." The court,
en banc, however, found it unnecessary to resolve the fourteenth
amendment issue raised, for in the court's view the Braults had failed
81. Id. at 894.
82. 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc).
83. Id. at 741.
84. The panel members hearing the case were Judges Oakes, Smith, and Timbers.
Judge Timbers filed a dissent to the panel decision, in which he admonished the majority
for ignoring the congressional intent to exempt municipalities from liability in damages
for violations of the fourteenth amendment as evidenced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According
to Judge Timbers, this presented that "affirmative action by Congress" counselling hesita-
tion which was absent in Bivens. 527 F.2d at 735-36 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 732. But see Moneil v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(municipality is a person within the meaning of § 1983).
86. 527 F.2d at 732.
87. Id. at 734. In May, 1967, the town of Milton secured a temporary injunction pro-
hibiting the Braults from using their land as a trailer park. The zoning ordinance used by
the town to procure the injunction was later declared invalid. Thus, the Braults argued
that since the town knew or should have known of the invalidity of the zoning ordinance,
the town's actions in obtaining and maintaining the injunction deprived them of due pro-
cess of law in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 732-33.
88. Id. at 736.
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to state a claim entitling them to relief.8 9 Concluding that the Braults'
rights under the due process clause had not been violated in the Ver-
mont courts," the court en banc was able to affirm the decision of the
district court which dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
for relief. 1
IV. BIvENS REVISITED: THE CASES OF
DAVIS V. PASSMAN AND CARLSON V GREEN
The apparent uncertainty in the federal circuits surrounding the
Bivens doctrine has caused a serious lack of uniformity in the applica-
tion of the judicially created constitutional remedy. The fault lies in
the Supreme Court's failure to fully outline the extent of Bivens.
Recently, the Supreme Court reviewed the Bivens cause of action in
deciding the cases of Davis v. Passman" and Carlson v. Green . 3
A. Davis v. Passman
Shirley Davis was hired by Otto E. Passman, a United States Con-
gressman from the Fifth Congressional District of Louisiana, on Febru-
ary 1, 1974, as a deputy administrative assistant. Her employment
was terminated, effective July 31, 1974, because Representative
Passman felt that it was essential that his deputy administrative assis-
tant be a man. 5 Davis brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana," alleging that Passman had
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of the
89. Id. The court en banc characterized the Braults' action as one for malicious pros-
ecution, since the "gist of the Braults' complaint [was] that the Town violated their due
process rights by invoking the processes of the Vermont state courts to enforce an or-
dinance which turned out to be invalid." Id. at 738. To succeed, then, the Braults were re-
quired to allege malice. Id. Finding no malice, the court maintained that the plaintiff's use
of the judicial process to enforce a right was "the very antithesis of denial of due
process." Id.
90. Id. at 738-39.
91. Id. at 740-41. In a dissenting opinion written by Judge Oakes with whom Judge
Smith joined, the majority was said to have sidestepped the constitutional damages issue.
Judge Oakes believed the pleading of the fourteenth amendment claim was clear and
necessitated a decision. In his view, what the majority had described as a failure to state
a claim was in reality "an adjudication on the merits that the Constitution affords no
remedy to persons deprived of property by the incorrect application of state judicial
authority." Id. at 741 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
92. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). It is interesting to note that the 1979 Davis, like Bivens, was
penned by Justice Brennan and appears after an eight year silence by the Court.
93. 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980).
94. 442 U.S. at 230.
95. Id.
96. Davis v. Passman, No. 74-745 (W.D. La. Feb. 26, 1975).
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fifth amendment.' She sought damages in the form of back pay. 8 The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, holding that the discharge of the plain-
tiff on the basis of sex was not violative of the fifth amendment and
that the law affords no private cause of action for the plaintiff's claim."
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion and remanded the case for trial.'" The panel concluded, inter alia,
that, taking the complaint's allegations as true, Davis' dismissal on the
basis of gender violated the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment's due process clause, and that under Bivens the Constitu-
tion itself affords the dismissed staff member a damages remedy."'
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed
the decision of the panel,' 2 holding that "no right of action may be im-
plied from the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment .... ,103 Cer-
tiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court."
At the outset of the majority opinion in Passman, Justice Brennan
precisely articulated that the issue before the Court was "whether a
cause of action and a damages remedy can .. . be implied directly
under the Constitution when the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is violated."'0 5 Moreover, he noted that the Supreme Court
in Bivens had already permitted a cause of action for damages to be
implied directly under the fourth amendment'" and that Bivens re-
cently had been reaffirmed by the Court in Butz v. Economou.'°' With
this introduction the stage was set for extending the constitutionally
implied cause of action for damages to cases involving fifth amendment
claims.
The Davis opinion itself can be logically divided into two sections:
The first half of the opinion establishes the existence of a cause of ac-
97. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 231.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 232.
100. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc).
101. Id. at 882.
102. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd and remanded,
442 U.S. 925 (1979).
103. Id. at 801.
104. 439 U.S. 925 (1978).
105. 442 U.S. at 230.
106. Id. at 234.
107. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In reaffirming Bivens, the Butz Court wrote, "[T]he decision
in Bivens, established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally
protected interest could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district




tion under the fifth amendment and the second half discusses the ap-
propriateness of a damages remedy. According to Justice Brennan, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred when it concluded that
Davis had no cause of action. 8 Justice Brennan specifically faulted the
circuit court for relying wholly upon the Cort v. Ash'" criteria, which
are used to determine whether a private cause of action may be im-
plied from a statute not expressly providing one."0 Such reliance was
misplaced, in Justice Brennan's view, for "the question of who may en-
force a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of
who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution." ''
Justice Brennan maintained that, unlike statutory rights which are
established by Congress and, therefore, appropriately managed by con-
gressional regulatory schemes, the enforcement of constitutional rights
rests primarily with the judiciary."' Further, Justice Brennan noted
the existence of a presumption that justiciable constitutional rights are
to be enforced through the courts absent a "textually demonstratable
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment.""' Justice Brennan's emphasis on the defense of the judiciary as
enforcer of constitutional rights is perhaps a reply to the criticism
levied against his earlier Bivens majority opinion"' as well as an an-
ticipated reply for those dissenting Justices in Davis who again
asserted the separation of powers argument. In any event, after firmly
establishing judicial supremacy in the enforcement of constitutional
rights, Justice Brennan, proceeding in accordance with the approach
outlined in Bell, Wheeldin, and Bivens,"5 recognized that the case in-
volved a constitutional right, that there had been a violation of the
right, and that it was the government's duty to afford the individual
protection of the laws whenever he suffers an injury."" Provided with
108. 442 U.S. at 236-37. Justice Brennan immediately defined the term "cause of ac-
tion" as it had been used by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He noted that the
traditional definition, which refers to the alleged invasion of a recognized legal right upon
which a litigant bases his claim for relief, was not utilized by the circuit court. Id. at 237.
Instead, the definition assigned by the circuit court dealt with who may judicially enforce
statutory rights or obligations. Id. at 238.
109. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
110. 442 U.S. at 240.
111. Id. at 241 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 241-42. To substantiate this idea of judicial supremacy in the enforcement
of constitutional rights, Justice Brennan cited the statements made by James Madison
when he presented the Bill of Rights to Congress, which characterize the judiciary as the
guardian of constitutional rights. Id.
113. Id. at 242 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
114. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 18, 20-21, & 34 supra.
116. 442 U.S. at 242.
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this support, Justice Brennan concluded that Davis was an appropriate
party to invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the district
court to seek relief, and more importantly, that she had a cause of ac-
tion under the fifth amendment."7
Having established the existence of a cause of action, Justice Bren-
nan next addressed the availability of a judicially granted damages
remedy and concluded that the judicial award of monetary damages
was not only appropriate in the instant matter, but that it was the sole
relief available to Davis."' To reach this result, Justice Brennan, citing
Bell v. Hood,"9 pointed out the wide latitude of remedial discretion
possessed by federal courts to redress the wrong worked upon an in-
dividual's legal rights.2 Citing Bivens, Justice Brennan noted the par-
ticuilar ability of federal courts to provide relief in damages for the
violations of constitutional rights, provided there are "no special fac-
tors counselling hesitation . . . . 21 In addressing the presence of
"special factors counselling hesitation," Justice Brennan reasoned that
although a suit against a congressman for putatively unconstitutional
actions in the course of his official conduct does raise special concerns,
the concerns are coextensive with the protections afforded by the
Speech or Debate Clause, and if the accused's actions are not shielded
by the Clause, he is subject to the law as are ordinary persons. '2
Justice Brennan also observed that Congress had not explicitly denied
the recovery of money damages to persons in Davis' position.' 23 Con-
117. Id. at 244.
118. Id. at 245. Because Passman was no longer a congressman at the time of litiga-
tion, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement was not available as an alternative
remedy. Thus, the Court wrote, "For Davis as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing."' Id.
119. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
120. 442 U.S. at 245.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 246. Earlier in the opinion the Court addressed the problems surrounding
the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 6, cl. 1, which protects con-
gressmen for conduct necessary to perform their duties within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activities. Because the court of appeals in its en bane decision did not deter-
mine whether the conduct of Passman was shielded by the Clause, the Supreme Court did
not decide the matter. The Court, however, did note that defenses based upon the Clause
should be given priority. And because the questions concerning whether Davis' complaint
stated a cause of action and whether a damages remedy is an appropriate form of relief
were properly before the Court, the Court decided to resolve these issues instead of
remanding the case to the court of appeals for a determination of the Speech or Debate
Clause issue. 442 U.S. at 235 n.11.
123. 442 U.S. at 247. In proving this point, Justice Brennan maintained that, although
§ 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-16(aX1978), failed to
extend its protection to congressional employees who are not in the competitive service,
there is no evidence that Congress meant § 717 to foreclose alternative remedies available
to those not covered by the statute. 442 U.S. at 247.
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sidering the administrative problems that a damages remedy presents,
Justice Brennan reasoned that damages in the form of back pay was a
remedial issue without difficult questions of valuation or causation."2
Addressing the argument that a damages remedy would cause a
deluge of claims in the federal courts, Justice Brennan believed that a
sufficient check mechanism was available to prevent this occurrence;
where a plaintiff seeks a damages remedy under the Constitution, he
must first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have in fact been
violated. 5 Although Justice Brennan would permit Davis to redress
her injury with court awarded damages should she prevail on the
merits, he noted that "were Congress to create equally effective alter-
native remedies, the need for damages might be obviated.""1 8
In two of the three dissents1" filed, the majority opinion is faulted
for intruding upon the legitimate power of the legislature. Chief
Justice Burger essentially asserted a separation of powers theme; he
believed that Congress, and not the judiciary, has the sole power to set
the employment standards for its own staff."8 Similarly, Justice Powell
maintained that "principles of comity and separation of powers should
require a federal court to stay its hand" in this area.12 He wrote that
the majority decision in permitting a constitutionally implied cause of
action for damages is not an exercise of principled discretion, because
it has not accounted for the range of policy and constitutional con-
siderations which are normally reviewed by a legislature before it
decides to enact a particular remedy."' Thus, in the view of Justice
Powell, there has been a serious intrusion upon the authority of
members of Congress to choose and control their own personal staffs.1 '
Notwithstanding the arguments advanced by the dissenting Jus-
tices, Davis holds that a cause of action for damages may be directly
124. 442 U.S. at 245. Justice Brennan wrote, "Litigation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has given federal courts great experience evaluating claims for
backpay due to illegal sex discrimination." Id.
125. Id. at 248.
126. Id.
127. Dissenting opinions were filed by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Powell. While the opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Powell emphasized the separa-
tion of powers theme, the opinion of Justice Stewart dealt with the Speech or Debate
Clause implications of the case. Justice Stewart would vacate the judgment of the lower
court and remand the case with directions to decide the Speech or Debate Clause issue.
Id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
128. Chief Justice Burger wrote: "At this level of Government-staff assistants of
Members-long accepted concepts of separation of powers dictate, for me, that until Con-
gress legislates otherwise as to employment standards for its own staffs, judicial power in
this area is circumscribed." Id. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting).




implied under the fifth amendment. With the Davis decision, the
Supreme Court reaffirms the validity of and necessity for a cause of
action for damages implied directly under the Constitution. The deci-
sion also reassures the judiciary of its authority to grant a damages
remedy. The key factor prompting this award of aggressive remedial
relief again appears to be the Court's recognition that constitutional
rights are merely precatory absent an effective means for enforcing
them."2 Because neither the Constitution itself nor the legislature has
provided relief for the type of violation experienced by an individual in
Davis' position, her only recourse is to seek a judicial remedy. But
Davis' situation, like Bivens', is even more complex, for her relief must
come in the form of a damages remedy, 13 3 and this resurrects the tradi-
tional separation of powers argument." Had Davis or Bivens sought
equitable relief, little or no criticism would have issued, because the
federal courts have been accepted as the proper source for such reme-
dial measures. 1 5 Why the judiciary possesses the unquestioned power
to award equitable but not legal remedies has never been answered,
perhaps because no valid reason exists for this disparity in judicial
authority. It seems obvious that in cases such as Davis and Bivens
where a remedy at law is the only one available to effectuate a con-
stitutional right, that remedy must be freely granted by the judiciary.
The Constitution has given Davis the right not to be fired on the basis
of her sex and Bivens the right to be free of illegal searches and
seizures: these fundamental rights are to be absolutely protected,
either to the extent provided by the Constitution itself, legislative
mandate, or court decree. Although Justice Brennan recognized in both
Bivens and Davis the judiciary's obligation to fashion relief to compen-
sate for constitutional violations, he does indicate that judicial in-
tervention in this area might be supplanted by legislative decree, pro-
viding for effective alternative relief." But until the legislature acts,
the courts must actively function as the enforcers of constitutional
rights, if those rights are to have any significance.
132. Id. at 242. Justice Brennan, discussing the importance of providing an individual
with a redress for violations of his constitutional right, wrote:
[U]nless such rights are to become merely precatory, the class of those litigants
who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the
same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights,
must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of
their justiciable constitutional rights.
Id.
133. See notes 44 & 126 and accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
135. See note 8 supra.
136. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Carlson v. Green
Marie Green, acting as administratrix, brought suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana on behalf of the estate of
her deceased son, Joseph Jones, Jr., alleging that the federal prison of-
ficials had violated, inter alia, his eighth amendment rights by failing
to give him proper medical attention, thereby causing his death. The
district court held 37 that a Bivens cause of action for damages was
available, since the allegations pleaded a violation of the eighth amend-
ment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. The court,
however, dismissed the complaint, finding that, although the decedent
could have maintained the action had he survived, the damages rem-
edy as a matter of federal law was limited to that provided by
Indiana's survivorship and wrongful death laws and that, under the In-
diana statute, recovery could not possibly amount to $10,000. There-
fore, the court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with
the conclusion that a direct constitutional action for damages was
proper, but reversed the district court's holding that the jurisdictional
amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) was not met."9 Certiorari
was granted by the United States Supreme Court."'
Affirming the decision of the court of appeals, and extending the
Bivens cause of action to eighth amendment claims, the majority opin-
ion of the United States Supreme Court, once again penned by Justice
Brennan, gives further insight into the constitutional damages remedy.
Justice Brennan boldly began the Carlson majority opinion by stating
that victims of constitutional violations by a federal agent have a right
to recover damages against that official in federal court despite the
lack of statutory authority."' He continued to explain, however, that
such a cause of action may be defeated in two specific instances: First,
137. Green v. Carlson, No. TH 76-93-C (S.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 1977), rev'd and remanded,
581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978).
138. Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1470-71 (1980).
139. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978), affd, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980). Turn-
ing to the question of the survival of the cause of action, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit applied the principles and analysis found in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584 (1978) (action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several defendants for bad
faith prosecution), even though the instant suit was not based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ac-
cordingly, the court examined the law of Indiana, the forum state, concerning survival of
actions. Rejecting the district judge's assumption that Indiana's wrongful death act was
the proper vehicle for the suit, the court of appeals concluded that Mrs. Green was assert-
ing her son's cause of action, and not a cause of action for her losses, occasioned by his
death. 581 F.2d at 672 n.4. Thus, the court of appeals reasoned that federal common law
permitted survival of the action. Id. at 674.
140. Carlson v. Green, 442 U.S. 940 (1979).
141. 100 S. Ct. at 1472.
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if the defendants demonstrate "special factors counselling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress;" or second, if the
defendants establish "that Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective." '
Proving the absence of these two situations became the focal point of
Justice Brennan's discussion in Carlson.
Little analysis was afforded the first point. Justice Brennan merely
concluded that the instant case involved no special factors counselling
hesitation, since the petitioners, the federal officers, "[did] not enjoy
such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that
judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate.""'
Extensive discussion, however, was given the second point regarding
alternative remedies explicitly designated by Congress. Although the
petitioners pointed out that a legislative remedy was immediately
available under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Justice Brennan
denied the exclusivity of such a remedy, finding nothing in the FTCA
itself or its legislative history which indicated that "Congress meant to
pre-empt a Bivens remedy or to create an equally effective remedy for
constitutional violations.""' In fact, citing the congressional comments
accompanying the amendment, Justice Brennan was able to substan-
tiate his position that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as "parallel,
complementary causes of action ...."I"
Given the choice, then, between the two remedies, the Bivens
remedy was determined to be more effective."7 To buttress this claim
that the Bivens remedy was superior to the FTCA remedy, Justice
Brennan offered four additional factors: First, that the Bivens remedy
not only compensates the victim but also serves a deterrent purpose;"'
142. Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. at 396, and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 245).
143. 100 S. Ct. at 1472 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. Furthermore, Justice Brennan recognized that the officers did possess a
qualified immunity under Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), and that this would pre-
vent them from being inhibited in the performance of their official duties. 100 S. Ct. at
1472.
145. 100 S. Ct. at 1472.
146. Id. The comments indicate that the individual who is subjected to the Bivens-type
raid is to have a cause of action against both the individual federal agents as well as the
federal government. Moreover, the comments clearly require that the amendment is to be
viewed as a counterpart to Bivens. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1973)).
147. Justice Brennan concluded that FTCA was not a "sufficient protector of the
citizens' constitutional rights ...." 100 S. Ct. at 1474.
148. Id. at 1473. It was argued that the Bivens remedy is a more effective deterrent




second, that punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit but
are prohibited in an FTCA suit;"' third, that an FTCA action, unlike a
Bivens action, does not allow a plaintiff to opt for a jury trial;'' and
fourth, that an action under FTCA is not uniformly commenced
throughout the states since such an action exists only if the state in
which the alleged misconduct occurred permits the cause of action to
proceed."' Thus, the Court held that a damages remedy was directly
available under the Constitution for eighth amendment claims even
though the allegations presented could also support a suit against the
United States under the FTCA."12
Although in the concurring opinion, authored by Justice Powell and
joined by Justice Stewart, the two Justices agreed that a private
damages remedy was properly inferred from the Constitution in this
case,'" they faulted the majority for imposing "unnecessarily rigid
conditions '"' upon the defendant, ie., that the defendant must show
that Congress explicitly declared its remedy to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution and views it as equally effec-
tive .15 Accordingly, Justices Powell and Stewart could not agree that a
Bivens plaintiff had a right to the constitutional damages remedy
whenever the defendant failed to meet his burden.58 In the view of
these two Justices, the majority's willingness to infer federal causes of
action absent constitutional or statutory authority "denigrates the doc-
trine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a rational
system of justice.""' 7
Likewise, the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist'58 echoed this
last point emphasized by the concurring Justices: That is, although
149. Id. at 1473-74. The majority viewed punitive damages especially appropriate since
punitive damages are recoverable in a § 1983 action. According to the court, an in-
congruous result would occur if federal officials did not face at least the same liability as
state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression. Id.
150. Id. at 1474.
151. Id. In the words of Justice Brennan, "The question whether respondent's action
for violations by federal officials of federal constitutional rights should be left to the
vagaries of the law of the several States admits of only a negative answer in the absence
of a contrary congressional resolution." Id.
152. The remainder of the majority opinion is devoted to the issue of whether the sur-
vival of the cause of action is governed by federal common law or by state statutes. The
Court held that federal common law predominates. Because the matter is outside the
scope of this comment, it will not be discussed in detail.
153. 100 S. Ct. at 1477 (Powell, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1476 (Powell, J., concurring).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1477 (Powell, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist's dissent exposed several weak points in the ma-
jority's analysis,"9 the cohesive theme repeated throughout is that of
separation of powers. For Justice Rehnquist, the creation of the con-
stitutional damages remedy is more appropriately left to legislative
design.1 0 Chief Justice Burger, however, berated the majority for not
finding the FTCA an adequate remedy for prisoners' claims of medical
mistreatment.'" He believed that the Court would be obliged to retreat
from the stringent test enunciated by the majority which required
Congress to explicitly declare that its legislative remedy was intended
to be a substitute for constitutionally implied relief."2 Such a test, in
the opinion of the Chief Justice, would create a series of complex prob-
lems. For example, he pointed out that "there is 'no explicit congres-
sional declaration' . . . that § 1983 was meant to preempt a Bivens
remedy,"' 3 and this suggested that the test seemed to permit a person
whose constitutional rights have been violated by a state officer to
bring the suit under Bivens even though Congress has fashioned an
equally effective remedy.'
This criticism, however, is misplaced, for the Chief Justice failed to
recognize that the majority had, in fact, addressed this issue and had
offered a viable solution. In Carlson there was no explicit congressional
declaration that the victim of a constitutional violation may not
recover from the responsible federal employee but must instead be
remitted to the statutory cause of action against the government
outlined in the Federal Tort Claims Act. Thus, when presented with
the availability of both a legislative and the constitutionally implied
damages remedy, the majority in Carlson weighed the effectiveness of
both remedies in relation to the claim asserted."5 Although the
judicially created remedy was deemed best in Carlson, the presence of
other determinative factors in subsequent cases could militate against
159. According to Justice Rehnquist, the majority opinion was flawed in several
respects: it offered no guidance "for deciding when a constitutional provision permits an
inference that an individual may recover damages and when it does not," id. at 1480
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); it necessitated "the creation of a body of common law
analogous to that repudiated in [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)]," 100 S. Ct. at 1482 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); it failed to explain fully the effectiveness of the Bivens remedy as a deter-
rent, id. at 1485-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); it incorrectly stated that the Court permits
an award of punitive damages in a Bivens action, id. at 1486-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
and it failed to articulate any solid basis for its uniformity argument, id. at 1488 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
160. 100 S. Ct. at 1480 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1478 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. Id.
165. See notes 150-53 and accompanying text supra.
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such a result and in favor of the legislative relief. The more effective
remedy, in the estimation of the Court, is the correct remedy to apply.
It must be conceded, however, that the Court does not outline in detail
how effectiveness is to be decided in every instance.
For the most part, the stance taken in Carlson is consistent with the
approach taken in the earlier Bivens and Davis decisions. In point of
fact, both Bivens and Davis held that only an "explicit congressional
declaration" that personal damages liability should not be available
would preclude the courts from entertaining a constitutional remedy. 6
The decision is also consistent in its immediate willingness to extend
the Bivens cause of action to other constitutional amendments in order
to vindicate constitutional wrongs.
C. The Effect of Davis and Carlson
Davis, in its holding that the fifth amendment supports an action for
damages, and Carlson, in its holding that the eighth amendment sup-
ports an action for damages, explicitly dispel the notion that the
damages remedy is circumscribed to fourth amendment violations and
implicitly acknowledges that a constitutionally implied damages
remedy is an appropriate form of redress where the substantive rights
outlined in other constitutional amendments have been violated. But
these latest pronouncements by the Supreme Court fail to offer lower
federal courts the detailed direction they have patiently awaited and
seriously need. Like Bivens, the Davis and Carlson decisions fail to
outline fully the substantive and procedural limitations of the constitu-
tionally implied cause of action for damages.
Nevertheless, in analyzing all three decisions -Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson-there are certain general guidelines that can be ascertained.
Initially, the plaintiff must not only demonstrate that his claim in-
volves a constitutional right, but must also prove the violation of that
right. Once this has been established, the plaintiff's complaint will be
dismissed, unless it can be determined that judicial relief in the form
of a damages remedy is appropriate. Regarding this last point several
factors must be considered. At the outset, it must be established that
the plaintiff has a compensable injury. When determining this, the
court must decide whether there are valuation or causation problems
which could prohibit the award of damages. According to Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens, although courts of law faced
with a claim arising under the fourth amendment "are capable of mak-
ing the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of in-
166. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 247; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 397.
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jury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of
[those] Fourth Amendment rights,' 167 the same may not be true with
respect to other types of constitutionally protected interests."' The
Davis Court, dealing with a fifth amendment claim, noted that because
the plaintiff sought back pay, the case presented a "focused remedial
issue without difficult questions of valuation or causation."' 9 It ap-
pears, then, that in considering claims other than fourth amendment
claims, courts should apply the damages remedy only when the claim
involves a "focused remedial issue." But what exactly constitutes such
an issue remains an open question.
Additionally, before awarding damages the court must be certain
that equally effective alternative remedies are not available to the
plaintiff. For Bivens as well as Davis it was "damages or nothing."170
The import of the Bivens and Davis decisions, therefore, strongly sug-
gests that the constitutional damages remedy is limited to cir-
cumstances in which a plaintiff had no other effective remedy. For ex-
ample, should equally effective equitable relief be appropriate, this
would obviate the need for the constitutionally implied damages rem-
edy. Moreover, these two cases indicate that the court may provide
relief in damages where there are "no special factors counseling hesita-
tion"171 or where Congress has not designed an equally justifiable
remedy. If a legislative remedy exists, the courts, according to Justice
Brennan in Davis, "might" accord it some deference."7
The Carlson decision further explores the propriety of the Bivens
remedy where legislative relief also appears available to the plaintiff.
Following the rationale outlined in Carlson, once the court determines
the absence of "special factors counselling hesitation," it must then
decide whether there exists a legislative remedy which Congress has
clearly intended to be the exclusive remedy.173 Under Carlson, the
167. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 410 n.9.
169. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 245. See also note 134 and accompanying text
supra.
170. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 245; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
171. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 245; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396.
172. According to the Court in Davis, "[wlere Congress to create equally effective
alternative remedies, the need for damages relief might be obviated." 442 U.S. at 248. The
use of the word "might" is deliberate. If the legislature provides an adequate remedy, in
the estimation of the deciding court, that remedy can be applied; however, should it be
viewed as inadequate, the court still possesses the discretionary power to dismiss the
legislative remedy and instead apply the judicial damages remedy. See id. at 248. See also
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 397.
173. Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. at 1472.
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defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that there are "special
factors counselling hesitation" or the existence of an exclusive
legislative remedy. Carlson fails, however, to explain the extent of the
"special factors counselling hesitation;" this appears to be left to the
discretion and good judgment of the court entertaining the Bivens ac-
tion. Concerning the question of exclusivity of statutory relief, Carlson
exacts two requirements: Specific legislative language declaring the
remedy to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution;
and evidence that the remedy is equally effective.'7 Where a statute
exists but there is no explicit designation by Congress that the
remedial relief provided is to be exclusive, it appears that the court
has a choice of remedies-it can choose to apply either the legislative
or judicially created remedy, depending on which remedy is resolved
to be the more effective one. Although the determinants of effec-
tiveness in Carlson included the deterrent value of a Bivens remedy,
the availability of punitive damages under Bivens, the option of a jury
trial in connectin with a Bivens action, and the uniformity that a
Bivens action promotes,175 the Supreme Court did not signify that
these were the only factors to be considered. This too remains within
the discretion and good judgment of the reviewing court.
V. CONCLUSION
Insofar as their ordinary jurisdiction and remedial authority permit,
our federal and state courts are obliged to provide the remedies which
have been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States to
be necessary to the implementation of the Constitution. 171 With the
emergence of Bivens, an award of damages was deemed appropriate
constitutional relief. And although it is not yet entirely clear when the
damages remedy may be properly invoked, the holding and analysis of
the Davis and Carlson decisions, when read in conjunction with the
earlier Bivens decision, offer lower federal and state courts a more
structured base from which to begin their examinations.'17
174. Id.
175. See notes 148-51 and accompanying text supra.
176. See Hill, note 5 supra.
177. In point of fact, in two recent circuit court decisions, the constitutionally implied
damages remedy has been approached more confidently. See Bush v. Lucas, 598 F.2d 958
(5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Carlson v.
Green, 100 S. Ct. 1846 (1980). The appeals court held, inter alia, that, in view of the
available adminstrative remedies under Civil Service Commission rules, there was no
right of action under the Constitution for damages based upon retaliatory demotion. See
also Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1045 (1980). The
Brice court determined damages for alleged eighth amendment violations to be inap-




Moreover, this trio of cases by the United States Supreme Court il-
lustrates that although the judiciary recognizes its obligation and
power as enforcer of constitutional rights to apply a damages remedy
when the factual circumstances of a particular case so mandate, the
judiciary will not apply the remedy without seriously considering other
available alternatives, especially the existence of legislative remedies.
Criticism that the judiciary has wrongfully invaded the power of the
legislature notwithstanding, the judiciary can be seen acting in concert
with the duty shared by both of these arms of the government: the du-
ty to insure that a readily available means for asserting our constitu-
tional rights always exists. Given this last consideration, it is easy to
agree with Circuit Judge Goldberg's dissent in Davis where he con-
cluded that while some people may find Bivens "an abhorrent aber-
rance in our jurisprudence," he believed "its benevolent embrace of
constitutional rights [to be] a treasure in our judicial trove," and, thus,
would not desecrate one syllable of the Bivens opinion by deviating
from its high purpose."
Marilyn Sydeski
178. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 819 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
1980

